There is a need for protocols to achieve universal interoperability among web services and to provide a fair and secure environment with non-repudiation. BPEL provides a language for the formal specification of business processes and business interaction protocols. In this paper we propose and a verify nonrepudiation protocol using Petri Nets for chain-linked business transactions and show that they may be specified in BPEL.
Introduction
Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) for Web Services is a language for the formal specification of business processes and business interaction protocols [1] . Linking web services together into a one large business process introduces a number of security problems. One of these problems is non-repudiation which means denial of having participated in a message exchange [2] . In this paper, we propose non-repudiation protocols for chain-linked business transactions involving web services. The proposed protocols are specified in BPEL and we use Petri Net theory to analyze the proposed non-repudiation protocols.
A detailed description of BPEL can be found in [1] . There are two approaches for non-repudiation. The message is encrypted with a secret key and sent to the receiver and then the two parties exchange a delivery receipt and the message key to get the original message. An alternate approach is to involve a trusted third party. Zhou [2] describes non-repudiation protocols in a number of scenarios between two entities. In Zhou and Gollmann's fair protocol [3] , a Trusted Third Party (TTP) is involved and in this protocol a cipher text of the message is sent first and then a key, which unlocks the message is released. In the non-repudiation message protocol for collaborative e-business [4] , the message is encrypted with secret key, which is generated at runtime. That key is 'double-encrypted', that is, the secret key is first encrypted with the receiver's public key and then with the public key of TTP. A nonrepudiation protocol for chain-linked transactions is reported in [5] . In our approach there is no need for the TTP to be available at the time of dispute. We outline verification of the protocol using Petri Nets and specify the protocol in BPEL to enable web services implementation.
Secure Model for Web Services
Two things are essential for security in web services:
• Confidentiality -no one can read the original messages except the party to which it is sent.
• Repudiation -Two kinds of disputes can arise [5] .
Repudiation of recipient and Repudiation of origin. We propose protocols for chain linked business transactions that protect confidentiality of message contents such that no unauthorized intermediary is able to read the original message. Non-repudiation is achieved by involving a trusted third authority (TTP) but this third party is not needed at the time of dispute. Furthermore, the third party cannot access the message sent between the business entities. In one case of the protocol, intermediate parties are not able to access and modify the original message. In the other case intermediate parties are able to access and modify the original message depending upon the authorization granted. Furthermore, we specify these non-repudiation protocols in BPEL and Petri net models are used to verify the protocols for security.
BPEL is a layer on top of WSDL, i.e., it uses WSDL to specify actions that should take place in a business process, and to describe the web services provided. Ports in WSDL must be associated with bindings, one of which is SOAP. We use the following notation [4] : X | Y : concatenation of two messages X and Y. MD (X) : message digest value of message X. eK(X) : encryption of message X with key K. 
Secure model for chain of transactions
Business transactions are rarely simple and may involve multiple parties in many different topologies. There is a need for non-repudiation in such environments. We consider here a chain-linked business transaction. Assume a supplier (X) wants to publish details about a new product. He publishes the information to a public market place such as Transora. Transora gets information from a lot of suppliers. Retailer (X) wants to know when new products are available. Retailer (X) has relationship with UCCnet. UCCnet sends information to a lot of retailers. There are a number of security issues: How can Retailer(X) be guaranteed that the information he received is indeed from Supplier(X)? Or how can Supplier(X) be guaranteed that Retailer(X) did actually get the new product detail? We propose a novel non-repudiation protocol for chain linked business transactions. Non-repudiation in a chain linked system is modeled as follows. A N Intermediate businesses (B, C …) can read message, modify it or add their own information.
Case 2
We propose a non-repudiation protocol for chain linked business transactions where intermediate nodes can access and modify messages. For example, in the flow below, A is the main supplier, C is a subcontractor, B is a shipper and N is the buyer. A sends information to B that N has requested a purchase and C is another supplier. This results in B sending information to C which replies to B. Some of this is shipping related and can be read and modified by B. The suppliers A and C also send other information which can only be seen and modified by buyer N only. Thus there is some data that can be modified by an intermediate service (B) whereas other data is meant only for the final destination process N and should be read or modified by any of the intermediate processes. Step 1: The originator A sends encrypted id-message, encrypted message, double encrypted key, treble signature and encrypted message to B (this segment is encrypted with a public key of B). Step 2: The originator A encrypts the id-message with public key of the TTP and sends it to the TTP.
A TTP: t_id | ePTTP (id-message)
Step 3: Intermediate node B decrypts message M using its private key, may modify it and sends an encrypted message (encrypted with public key of C) to C.
B C: t_id | ePC(message)
Step 4: Producer C gets the information and sends an encrypted message, double encrypted key, dual signature and encrypted message (encrypted with a public key of B) to the shipper B. em(C) = eKC(mC) where mC is the message from C for N that cannot be seen by B ek_from_C = ePN(KC) (KC-symmetric key generated by C) md4=MD(em(C)) em_for_B: message from C for B to read and modify em_for_B = ePB(M) where M is the message that can be seen and modified by B.
Step 5: Shipper B gets and forwards message from A (encrypted message , double encrypted key, id-message and treble signature), message from C (encrypted message, double encrypted key and dual signature), and sends his own encrypted message, double encrypted key and dual signature to Buyer N.
em(B) = eKB(mB) ek_from_B = ePN(KB)
where KB is a symmetric key generated by B and mB is a message from B to N. Step 6: id_N is first decrypted at N using private key of N: dSN(id_N). It is next encrypted using public key of TTP and sent to the TTP.
N TTP : t_id | ePTTP( id_message)
Step 7: TTP N : t_id | Positive acknowledgement.
Step 8: The recipient N sends Signature1, double encrypted key from A, double encrypted key from C, and double encrypted key from B to the TTP.
N TTP : t_id | A | N | md1 | md3 | md4 | md5 | dek(A) | dek(C) | dek(B) | sSN(t id | md1 | md3 | md4 | md5)
Step 9: TTP decrypts the double encrypted keys and sends the encrypted keys to N.
TTP N : t_id | ek_from_A|ek_from_B|ek_from_C
Step 10: The recipient N sends its signature2 on the digested secret keys to TTP.
N TTP : t id | sSN(MD(ek_from_A), MD(ek_from_B), MD(ek_from_C))
Step 11: TTP forwards both signatures to producer A which then forwards it to shipper B and producer C.
TTP A : t id | sSN(t id | md1 | md3 | md4 | md5 ) | sSN(MD(ek_from_A), MD(ek_from_B), MD(ek_from_C))
We give an informal analysis on our protocol.
• How can the buyer N be guaranteed that the price or any modifications it gets is indeed what was input by producer A (or C or B)? Buyer N checks the integrity of message from A using treble signature and from C and B using their dual signature. These are the only senders that can generate these signatures.
• Intermediate node cannot get the key and hence the message from TTP because of eP N ( id_message).
• A, B and C are guaranteed that buyer N did get the correct information and it was not tampered or read by any of the intermediate notes because of md1, md4 and md5 respectively in N's signature.
• Producer A is guaranteed that the information was not read by another node because A encrypts the information with a double encrypted key and no one can access the key without identifying himself. Colored Petri Net Model We model the protocol using colored Petri Nets. Such modeling allows us to verify and reason about the protocol. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed verification. Definition 1: A colored Petri Net (CPN) is a tuple CPN = (PN, , CR, E) where [6] • PN = (p, n, f, m) in an ordinary Petri net, -p is a set of places {p 1 ,p 2 ,…p n } -n is a set of transitions {t 1 ,t 2 ,…t m } -f is set of functions from places to transitions and from transitions to places -m is the initial marking of the net • = { 1 , 2 , …} is a finite set of colors, • CR is color factor such that CR(p) ⊆ , and CR(m(p)) ⊆ CR(P) • E, the arc function such that:
denotes distinct color at a place p, e.g. m(p) = g + r represents place p containing a token of color g and a token of color r, i.e., CR(m(p)) = {g, r}.
• CR(p) MS : Represents the set of multi set or bags over CR(p) e.g. given a set CR(p) = {a, b, ….}, the multi sets a, a+b, a+2b are members of CR(p). Petri Nets allow verification of properties of the protocol including liveness and deadlock properties. Each token color represents a web services transaction. We outline a verification of the reliability of the nonrepudiation protocol for chain-linked Transactions. We show that if any transaction does not take place due to failures or misbehavior, the protocol will terminate. Definition 2: Given a CPN, we define the number of distinct colors associated with a place p i as u i = | C(p i ) |. Definition 3: Given a CPN, we define the number of ways in which a transition t i can fire as v i = the number of consistent substitutions of each arc function f(p j , t i ) (the condition to be satisfied for the transition to fire) with the elements in C(p j ), where p j •t i . (•t i . is the set of input places of t i .) We regard a colored Petri net as continuous time homogeneous Markov process [7] and we can analyze the system reliability. Definition 4: System is reliable if and only if each input and output function of all transitions are reliable. where, reliability of the system is denoted by R(system) R(system) = R (I(t j )) AND R (O(t j )) R(system) = R (f(p i , t j )) AND R(f(t j , p k )) Now first consider R (f(p i , tj) R(f(t j , p k ) ), where p k t j • (set of output places of t j ). For each place p k in CPN, create as many places as u k and label them with color 1 , 2 , 3 ……, k and for each transition t j in CPN create as many transitions as v j and give them distinct label. Now draw the edges from every transition derived from t j to every transition p k with arc function E f (tj, pk) and substitute k in E f (tj, pk) with logical 1 which ensure a correct execution of t j , therefore
Hence; R(system) = R (f(p i , t j )) AND R(f(t j , p k )) This shows that in the Petri net a transition may not fire properly (due to communication failure or misbehaving nodes). We assume that the Petri Net is live. If a transition does not fire, then the liveness property is no longer true and this will terminate the system. Dispute Resolution Repudiation of Recipient: If recipient N denies receiving messages mA, mB, and mC, entity A, B and C can present evidence in the form of signatures of N plus the different messages, signatures, message digests and log information of the TTP. The presence of TTP is not required at the time of dispute. Repudiation of Origin: If A, B and C deny sending messages mA, mB, and mC respectively, N can present evidence in the form of treble signature of A, double signature of B and double signature of C plus the other messages, signature and message digests. Security Protocol Properties Fairness There is no violation of fairness if the protocol ends at step 1, step 4 and step 5 because of any misbehavior or miscommunication. This is because if an intermediate node tries to get access to the secret key, he needs to identify himself and this is not possible. The other steps can similarly be verified for fairness. Protection and integrity In this protocol there are two types of messages, one is only for the recipient N and the other is for the intermediate involved entities. It can be verified that this is achieved. Confidentiality The protocol provides confidentiality so that, no one including the TTP can access the original contents of messages but the recipient N. Timeliness: Protocol achieves timeliness as each involved entity can terminate the protocol at any time at his own judgment while maintaining fairness.
Space limitations prevent a complete BPEL specification. We provide the BPEL specification for producer process A. The producer accepts the order and sends the information to the buyer's preferred shipper B. The process A has two partners process B and Process TTP. The sequence of producer process A is as follows.
Begin sequence
• Invoke the process B and send all information.
• Invoke the process TTP to send the encrypted id_message.
• Receive the signatures from TTP.
• Send signatures to the process B. End sequence
Conclusions
In this paper we propose a non-repudiation protocol for chain linked web services where the TTP signature is not considered as evidence; therefore TTP availability is not required at the time of dispute resolution. Protocols were analyzed so that they fulfill the security and non-repudiation requirements. We proposed Petri nets to validate the flow of protocols. The secure web services flow is modeled using BPEL. Implementation of the protocols for performance measurement is one area for further work. Modeling of attacks on web services is another area for further research.
